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VII Oficina de Estudos Estratégicos (2018/1)  
(Código da Extensão: 36370)

# Clipping

## Choque Externo V: Ásia Taiwan III

**O que é um clipping?** Trata-se de um conjunto de matérias – extraídas de jornal ou da internet – a cerca de um determinado tema. Serve para reunir e sistematizar dados para debate ou análise.

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### Informes Sobre a Oficina em 2018

Conforme mencionado no Clipping anterior, este ano da Oficina de Estudos Estratégicos (OEE VIII) funcionará em novo local: Midbar, na Rua Fernandes Vieira, nº 508. Os encontros ocorrerão aos sábados das 9h às 13h a partir do dia 05 de maio.

## **Apresentação do Clipping**

Caso você esteja recebendo esse Clipping pela primeira vez, cabe ressaltar que, como o anterior, esse Clipping foi montado em atenção não somente aos debates da OEE VIII, mas também à disciplina de Análise de Conjuntura Internacional (ECO02084 – Turma A).

O propósito é o de facilitar ao público da Oficina e da Disciplina o acesso a saberes instrumentais ligados às idiossincrasias da atividade prática da análise de conjuntura, do que a saberes formais passíveis de transmissão pelo ensino regular.

O tema deste Clipping, como o título sugere, é o ingresso, em um horizonte predizível de eventos, de um choque externo, que poderá trazer consigo graves consequências para o Brasil.

Como sempre, o ponto de partida do Clipping consiste em responder à pergunta: “Qual o fato mais relevante da conjuntura internacional essa semana?”

Para esses efeitos, tem-se como acontecimentos que eventualmente podem importar para o choque externo, os que seguem:

27/04/18 – Relatório da Câmara dos EUA afirma não haver colusão entre Trump e a Rússia

29/04/18 – Discurso de Netanyahu sobre Programa Nuclear paralelo iraniano. Subida preço petróleo após palestra.

30/04/18 – Ataque israelense à Síria

30/04/18 – EUA confirma entrega de mísseis Javelin para Ucrânia

30/04/18 – Fim da Guerra da Coreia: encontro entre Moon Jae-in (Coreia do Sul) e Kim Jon-un (Coreia do Norte)

30/04/18 – Tsai oferece “ramo de oliveira” à China

1º/05/18 – Japão sediará encontro entre China e Coreia 9 de maio

Se a situação no Oriente Médio não fosse a atualmente vigente, o candidato a fato político da semana (e da história universal) que bateria qualquer concorrente seria a paz entre as Coreias. Embora a assinatura formal do tratado esteja à espera da Cúpula Kim Jon-un e Trump, depois da viagem de Pompeo (Secretário de Estado, “falcão” adepto da guerra com o Irã) e, agora, da Cúpula entre os dois líderes coreanos atesta-se que, com toda probabilidade, EUA e Coreia do Norte chegarão a um acordo. É por conta disso que já se anuncia a indicação de Trump para o Nobel da Paz. Essa indicação é relevante não só para o prestígio interno do mandatário estadunidense (sobretudo levando-se em conta as eleições de metade de mandato deste ano) mas também caso Trump decida valer-se da estabilização do Nordeste da Ásia para projetar força no Oriente Médio – atacar o Irã. O elemento complicador é que a China pode fazer o mesmo: valer-se da estabilidade do Nordeste para projetar força em direção ao Leste – atacar Taiwan.

A assinatura do Tratado de Paz certamente não significa a paz perpétua ou mesmo a construção de uma comunidade de segurança no Leste Asiático. Kim Jon-un lançou mão das armas nucleares para

manter sua capacidade de dissuasão, dada a obsolescência de seu arsenal convencional. Com o tratado de paz e a normalização das relações econômicas com o resto do mundo, com toda a possibilidade Kim Jon-un instrumentalizará seus resultados para obter as capacidades militares convencionais que antes lhe eram inacessíveis. De qualquer modo, a distensão na península certamente torna o Nordeste Asiático uma área de estabilidade.

É dentro desse contexto que devem ser analisadas as manobras da Presidente de Taiwan, Tsai Ing-Wen, referentes a “estender o ramo de oliveira” à China. São palavras de paz que contém uma declaração de guerra: implicitamente, exigem o reconhecimento da soberania de Taiwan (ver matéria 03). Nesse caso, a estabilidade da península pode ser o prenúncio de uma confrontação no Mar do Leste. A situação não é particularmente favorável a Taiwan, nem tanto pela disparidade das capacidades militares, mas sim por seu progressivo isolamento, dada a reaproximação do Japão à China. O discurso de Xi Jinping em Boao repercutiu na assinatura de importante acordo de cooperação econômica entre Japão e China e, no próximo 9 de maio em uma cúpula entre os presidentes de China, Coreia e Japão, que, para todos os efeitos, é o relançamento da comunidade do Leste Asiático. E, com toda probabilidade, o desengajamento do Japão da questão Taiwanesa.

Conquanto a presença estadunidense no Pacífico seja significativa, não seria razoável supor que pudessem prestar assistência à ilha a tempo em caso de uma invasão chinesa. O mesmo não se aplica às Forças de Autodefesa do Japão, cuja acentuada mobilidade e capacidade de combate, poderiam significar toda a diferença para dar tempo à chegada de tropas estadunidenses. Depois que a China removeu a principal ameaça à segurança do Japão – o Programa Nuclear da Coreia do Norte – e que este tornou-se sócio da China na iniciativa Belt and Road – da qual permanecem fora EUA e Índia – é razoável supor que os japoneses, doravante, considerarão Taiwan nos termos do Acordo firmado em 1973, quando do estabelecimento das relações diplomáticas China e Japão. Isto é, que há uma única China e que sua capital é Beijing.

Soma-se a isso, o predizível engajamento dos EUA no Golfo Pérsico e o aumento de tensões na Europa. É possível que os chineses do continente considerem estar diante de uma oportunidade única de por fim ao problema da herança dos tratados injustos (Shimonoseki, 1895), e da reunificação nacional e tomem a iniciativa de efetuar a integração pela força.

Aqui o principal obstáculo é a dependência da China do mercado estadunidense e o efeito sistêmico que isso possa ter para a economia mundial, o que obviamente inclui suas repercussões nas condições de vida na própria China. De nada serviria uma rápida vitória militar que arruinasse o desenvolvimento chinês. Entretanto, esta possibilidade não pode ser completamente excluída e sua análise associa-se tanto às implicações para o choque externo, quanto à compreensão dos desdobramentos da situação internacional.

Em pelo menos três ocasiões a China tomou a iniciativa no campo militar para proteger seus aliados. Em 1958, na Segunda Crise nos Estreitos, para aliviar a pressão sobre a Rússia na Crise do Líbano. Em 1962, durante a Crise dos Mísseis, para aliviar a pressão sobre os soviéticos em Cuba. Por fim, em 1979, para proteger os interesses do Japão e dos EUA no Sudeste da Ásia.

No que tange o choque externo e a conjuntura internacional na Ásia, cumpre, pois, adensar o estudo dos elementos de contexto, já que a seleção dos fatos (dados de conjuntura) parece estar-se dando de forma eficiente. Fica em questão estabelecer para a Frente Basilar (Teatro da Ásia) um equacionamento similar ao feito na Europa. Tentando-se sistematizar de que percurso depende a eclosão de uma guerra da China em Taiwan.

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<http://www.atimes.com/article/denuclearization-premiums-and-discounts/>  
**Denuclearization premiums and discounts**

It is not a done deal yet, but if North Korea comes in from the cold, who are the winners and who are the losers, region-wide?

By William Pesek  
 April 30, 2018

Does whiplash make a sound? One can almost hear the collective neck strain pervading Northeast Asia following South Korean President Moon Jae-in's meeting with North Korean leader Kim Jong-un.

The only thing that might be more pervasive is the air of cynicism surrounding the leaders of South and North Korea making nice, holding hands and pledging peace. Echoes of 2007 cloud the Northeast Asian skies. North Korea, many claim, can't be trusted, so let's get serious. And who'd trust Donald Trump? The US president is, after all, renegeing on an Iran nuclear deal that might be a model for Korean denuclearization.

Then again – what if this is for real?

South Korea: High stakes

Anyone who followed then-South Korean President Roh Moo-hyun's awkward visit with Kim Jong-il in 2007 can see the Moon-Kim vibe is different. If their apparent chemistry is all for the cameras, Kim must have been investing in acting lessons. Also, with China upping the stakes on sanctions, and Trump holding the stick while Moon previews the carrots, Friday's summit deserves a chance.

The seismic implications of peace are almost too many to contemplate. While there might be winners all around, the biggest would be Moon. He'd be a shoo-in for a Nobel Peace Prize. Trump is already angling for one, but hats off to Moon for doing the heavy lifting and taking the real risks.

Inviting the Kim clan to the recent Olympics, against minimal but widely reported opposition in the South, was a gutsy move. Trump, remember, deployed Vice President Mike Pence to Pyeongchang to make side-eyes at the Kims.

But it will be Moon left holding the bag if this latest Kim gamble goes awry – not Trump's White House.

China: pros and cons

China, depending on how you view it, is winner and loser. On the one hand, Xi Jinping's government might get a respite from Kim's nuclear tests and missile launches. Fewer angry calls from Washington, Brussels and Seoul would suit President Xi just fine. On the other, if Pyongyang does become a more normal state, Beijing could lose a very useful proxy and source of geopolitical leverage. Pyongyang's antics have long been a valuable way to throw the West off balance.

Japan: Pushed out of the picture

Moon and Kim hugging it out is a nightmare for Prime Minister Shinzo Abe. Already on the ropes amid cronyism scandals and a Trump bromance gone wrong, Abe is having to explain a few uncomfortable truths to voters.

One is why Japan, Northeast Asia's leading democracy, was left out. Perhaps it was Xi's way of twisting the knife at Abe and his fellow nationalists. Perhaps it's Kim's dynastic revenge for long-ago wartime aggression: His grandfather was a leading partisan.

Making matters worse, even Trump excluded Abe from the most important geopolitical event in Tokyo's backyard. The POTUS signed on to a Kim meeting without consulting Tokyo. That's left Team Abe looking terribly small – complaining about a flag used in desserts at the Moon-Kim summit and asking Trump to please, please ask Kim about Japanese abducted by Pyongyang decades ago. Will Trump even bother?

There's another way the peace process could blow up on Abe's Liberal Democratic Party: demands for reparations. In 1965, Tokyo paid just that to Seoul for its wartime aggression and colonization. If a dessert made Abe's fellow nationalists squirm, imagine how they'll feel when Kim pulls out his calculator. With the world, and posterity, watching, Tokyo would have a hard time saying no.

Russia: Pipeline please

Another potential winner: Vladimir Putin's Russia, which has been a side player in the latest North Korea détente process. Not for long, though, if Kim okays a more porous demilitarized zone.

Moscow's likely focus: resurrecting a decade-old dream of building a pipeline to South Korea. In late March, Kang Kyung-wha, South Korea's foreign minister, said: "Should the security situation on the Korean Peninsula improve, we will be able to review the PNG [pipeline natural gas] business involving the two Koreas and Russia." That – and a trans-Korean rail link to the Trans-Siberian Express, even a power cable to the south – would be music to Putin's ears.

US: A Nobel for POTUS?

Trump, meantime, may be on the cusp of an epochal geopolitical win. Firing Tomahawk missiles at Syria made Americans feel good, but changed nothing. If Trump's bluster really did coax Kim to the table, then his White House deserves credit.

Of course, Kim could be playing chess with a checkers president. Just as it's possible Trump's "fire and fury" barbs spooked Kim into dealing, Kim could be calculating that Trump is an ideal dupe.

So confident is Trump in his "art of the deal" that he may be swaggering into a trap. Kim gets the meeting with an American president his dad never could, and the photo-op of a lifetime. Then, once Pyongyang secures lots of spoils and buys time, it's back to Kim family business as usual.

The odds of Kim ever giving up his nukes, after all, are extraordinarily small. There's a flip-side here, though. If Trump feels played, he might give his new national-security chief, uber-hawk John Bolton, the green light to gleefully open fire.

Friday’s summit deserves a real shot. It’s easy to roll one’s eyes at events in the truce village of Panmunjom; harder to give peace a chance.

In the meantime, neck braces are selling out around the globe.

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<http://www.atimes.com/trump-back-independence-bid-taiwan/>  
**Would Trump back an independence bid by Taiwan?**

By Gary Sands  
March 30, 2018

Ever since Tsai Ing-Wen and her pro-independence Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) assumed the leadership of Taiwan in 2016, Beijing has been on the offensive against any notion of independence. After Tsai refused to affirm the 1992 Consensus and the “one China” framework, Beijing has actively sought to isolate Taipei diplomatically and threatened its shores with its military. In 2017, Chinese military aircraft, including bombers and advanced fighter jets, repeatedly flew an “unprecedented” number of sorties close to Taiwanese air space, according to Taiwanese military officials. The Chinese People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) also sailed its aircraft carrier, the Liaoning, along the center line dividing the strait between China and Taiwan that same year.

Despite Tsai branding the DPP as a party of peace, it has a long history of favoring formal independence, as do other political forces on the island. In February, two former Taiwan presidents, Lee Teng-hui (former Nationalist or Kuomintang president) and Chen Shui-bian, (the first DPP president from 2000 to 2008), formally backed a campaign to hold a referendum on April 6, 2019 over Taiwan’s independence. The campaign was launched by Kuo Bei-hong, chairman of Formosa Television channel, who set the date to mark the 30th anniversary of the self-immolation of Deng Nan-jung, a Taiwan independence and democracy advocate.

For Beijing, the referendum proposal confirms their suspicion that Tsai is pushing for formal independence, though so far her government has not publicly come out in favor of the campaign. Chinese President Xi Jinping has been a vocal opponent of Taiwan’s independence, and seemingly links reunification of Taiwan with China’s Great Rejuvenation by 2050. In an unexpected address at the close of the National People’s Congress held earlier this month, Xi garnished his loudest applause by warning Taiwan that “All acts and tricks to split the motherland are doomed to failure and will be condemned by the people and punished by history.” His re-elected premier, Li Keqiang, had earlier warned Taipei against any “separatist schemes.”

Xi’s immediacy is in sharp contrast to Chairman Mao Zedong, who told Henry Kissinger in 1975 that China did not want Taiwan: “It’s better for it to be in your hands... A hundred years hence we will want it, and we are going to fight for it.” Deng Xiaoping was also notably patient, instructing the next leadership to: “Observe carefully; secure our position; cope with affairs calmly; hide our capacities and bide our time; be good at maintaining a low profile; and never claim leadership.”

For his part, Jiang Zemin believed: “On the Taiwan issue the Shanghai Communique established a good formula.” Yet the new Chinese President-for-Life Xi Jinping appears to have run out of patience and is anxious to project the power he has carefully amassed.

Hong Kong-based political analyst Willy Lam goes further, believing the return of Taiwan is “Xi Jinping’s major ambition. He is obsessed by reunification because it will be his place in history, his claim to immortality.” Xi’s ambition is reaffirmed by Ian Easton of the 2049 Institute, who claims in his new book *The Chinese Invasion Threat: Taiwan’s Defense and American Strategy in Asia* that Xi told Communist Party leaders in 2012 of plans to invade Taiwan by 2020. Easton posits an invasion could happen before July 2021, marking the 100th anniversary of the founding of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).

While the American public may have no appetite for another war or the return of the US armed forces to the island, Mike Pompeo, the new US secretary of state, a China hawk, could push for a forceful stand

Currently, referendums in Taiwan cannot be held based on issues of national sovereignty. Indeed, in 1979, it was a crime to advocate the total independence of Taiwan from China. However, if that were to change, a referendum over independence could possibly push Xi and his PLA toward a face-saving measure. While a full-scale invasion is unlikely, Xi could decide on a show of limited military force, to test the will and resolve of the Trump Administration and the American public under the Taiwan Relations Act.

While the American public may have no appetite for another war or the return of the US armed forces to the island, Mike Pompeo, the new US secretary of state, a China hawk, could push for a forceful stand. So too could John Bolton, the new national security adviser, who once recommended Washington’s recognition of Taiwan’s statehood.

On March 20, Beijing sailed its aircraft carrier into the Taiwan Strait. The sailing coincided with warnings issued to Taipei by Xi at the close of the National People’s Congress, and just days after the signing last week of the Taiwan Travel Act by Trump, recommending reciprocal visits by high-level American and Taiwanese government officials. The incursion drew the attention of Taiwanese defense forces, whose fighter jets and naval vessels shadowed the movements of the group, but so far there has been no reaction from the Trump Administration. For now, a potential referendum is almost a year away, but how the mercurial Trump, his hawkish national security adviser, and his ever-changing administration will react to immediate aggression from the mainland is unclear.

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<http://www.atimes.com/article/consensus-conundrum-and-peace-in-the-taiwan-strait/>

### **Consensus conundrum and peace in the Taiwan Strait**

Taiwan President Tsai Ing-wen's 'olive branch' to Beijing after Korean summit underlines the 'absurdity' of One China politics

By Chris Taylor  
April 30, 2018

In the wake of Friday’s historic inter-Korean summit, the inevitable happened, with Taiwan President Tsai Ing-wen making a purely symbolic gesture to Beijing. Her “olive branch” moment came when she announced she would be willing to meet Chinese President Xi Jinping “for peace and stability.”

Tsai’s move was symbolic because she also stated that such a meeting would have to be “without

any political precondition and on an equal footing.”

This makes the meeting impossible. It was also laden with irony given that it is the refusal of her Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) to bow to a political precondition set by Beijing that has led to a souring of relations in the Taiwan Strait and the usual “heightened tensions.”

The root of the problematic political precondition is one word, and the patent absurdity of how the problem came about becomes clear when you unpack its brief history.

#### The 1992 Consensus

The only time the leaders of Taiwan and China have met since the end of China’s Civil War in 1950 – Mao Zedong and Chiang Kai-shek last met in Chongqing in 1945 after the defeat of the Japanese – was in Singapore in November 2016.

The meeting was made possible by former Taiwan president Ma Ying-jeou’s political position on the question of one China. Specifically, Ma adhered to the so-called 1992 Consensus, which its supporters maintain provides wiggle room for both sides to agree that there is only one China but to disagree on what that is.

For the People’s Republic of China (PRC), acknowledgment of the so-called consensus should be a prelude to negotiations leading to unification. Unfortunately, and creating an irresolvable stalemate, neither side in 1992 appears to have used the word “consensus.” Taiwan’s ruling DPP argue there never was one, and some of those involved in the negotiations agree.

“Consensus denialists,” to coin a term, broadly argue that the talks of 1992 were never more than a tacit verbal “agreement” to disagree, and reported events appear to support that.

“Consensus denialists,” to coin a term, broadly argue that the talks of 1992 were never more than a tacit verbal “agreement” to disagree, and reported events appear to support that.

Under then President Lee Teng-hui, Taiwan’s Strait Exchange Foundation (SEF) and China’s Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Strait (ARATS) met in Hong Kong.

Several weeks after the meeting, apparently, in order to break an impasse in negotiations, ARATS agreed to an SEF proposal that both sides could have their own verbal definitions of what constitutes one China, a breakthrough usually summed up as “one China, respective definitions.”

But the water is muddied by the fact that Lee has publicly called the idea that a consensus was reached a fabrication, and in 2006 Nationalist Party Legislator Su Chi admitted he made the term up eight years after the negotiations between SEF and ARATS took place.

Su, who was head of Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Council (MAC) at the time of the talks, said he invented the term “1992 Consensus” ahead of the DPP coming to power in 2000 because it “sounded better” than “one China, respective definitions.”

In a rare case of a US representative discussing the issue, American Institute in Taiwan Chairman Raymond Burghardt made news in Taiwan in 2016 by saying that SEF chairman Koo Chen-foo used the term “1992 Understanding,” and not consensus. Koo, now deceased, even denied that a



consensus was reached.

### Holding Taiwan hostage

The fact that this is clearly a mess has not stopped Beijing from running with the term consensus and holding Taiwan hostage to it, as if to say: “We have to pretend to have agreed on something once in order to be able to talk again about anything else.”

During the 2015 meeting between Ma and Xi in Singapore, and in a pointed nod in the direction of the DPP, Xi said: “No matter which party or organization, and no matter what they stood for in the past, as long as the 1992 Consensus and its core values are acknowledged, we stand ready to have contact.”

It is difficult to say what the core values of a consensus that essentially amounts to “we disagree” might be, but Xi in effect ruled out direct negotiations with Tsai and the DPP nearly two years ago, and Tsai has reciprocated in kind in the wake of the inter-Korean Summit.

Meanwhile, if China’s Xi ends up being touted as a peacemaker on the Korean Peninsula – and already some are speculating on a shared Nobel Peace Prize with Donald Trump and South Korean President Moon Jae-in – it should be seen against the backdrop of an absurd impasse in the Taiwan Strait.

Moreover, it should be seen in the context of live-fire military war games there. and of an ever-assertive China that refuses to budge – even on one hijacked word that a Taiwan legislator made up.

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<http://www.atimes.com/article/us-b-52-bombers-fly-close-to-guangdong-coast/>  
**US B-52 bombers fly close to Guangdong coast**

Rarely had US strategic bombers been seen above waters so close to the Chinese shore

By Asia Times staff  
April 26, 2018

A pair of US B-52 Stratofortress strategic bombers reportedly flew within 250 kilometers of Guangdong’s coastline in southern China on Tuesday afternoon, according to Taiwan media and Aircraft Spots, a Twitter group that tracks aircraft movement and the deployment of the US Air Force.

The two long-range bombers, bearing registration numbers 57-1454 and 60-0360 with call signs HERO01 and HERO02, were spotted above the Bashi Channel between Taiwan and the Philippines and were believed to have come from the US outpost of Guam.

The bombers flew westward into the northern portion of the South China Sea and circled for about an hour above the Pratas Islands controlled by Taiwan, about 340 kilometers southeast of Hong Kong, before following another zigzag path back to the Kadena Air Base in the US territory, as shown in flight tracks posted by Aircraft Spots. It is also believed that the two bombers conducted air-to-air refueling near Okinawa.

The Taipei-based Liberty Times noted that rarely had US strategic bombers been seen above the waters close to the Chinese shore, where People’s Liberation Army bombers and spy planes such as H-6Ks used to frequent the air routes, when Beijing dispatched squadrons of aircraft to circumnavigate Taiwan.

The paper said the flight route indicated the bombers could have been involved in a mock attack involving Tomahawk cruise missiles targeting Guangdong’s coastal areas.

The maximum hit radius of a Tomahawk cruise missile is 2,500km. If fired from the Pratas Islands, a large number of PLA military installations would be within range.

The emergence of the B-52s was a tacit message that the US would respond if Beijing were to continue with its breaches of Taiwan’s airspace, said observers.

It is discernible that Beijing has sought to penetrate the blockade of the so called Second Island Chain – formed by the Ogasawara Islands and Volcano Islands of Japan, in addition to the US territory of Mariana Islands – with retrofitted H-6K bombers with extended range, fitted with precision-guided munitions, such as the air-launched version of the CJ-10K land-attack missiles.

These missiles have an operational range of 1,500km and are capable of hitting targets in Guam if fired from H-6Ks above the waters off Taiwan’s Pacific coast.

Also, rumor has it that Beijing’s H-6Ks, with aerial refueling, could fly close to Guam for direct bombardment, though the somewhat antiquated Chinese bombers modeled on a Soviet design have no stealth capabilities and could easily be detected by radar in Taiwan, Japan and Guam.

China’s defense ministry is yet to respond to the possible intrusion of China’s air defense zone and it is unclear if Chinese radar was triggered or Chinese aircraft conducted an interception.

But Chinese news portal Sina noted in a commentary on Thursday that the bulky B-52 bombers were equally vulnerable to Chinese radar, airborne early warning aircraft and even the powerful S-400 Triumph anti-aircraft missiles imported from Russia.

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<http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1094591.shtml>  
**Taiwan Travel Act to meet countermeasures**

Source: Global Times Published: 2018/3/21

Alex Wong, US deputy assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific affairs, arrived in Taipei on Tuesday. He became the first senior US State Department official to visit Taiwan after US President Donald Trump signed the Taiwan Travel Act. Some analysts said that with this trip Washington intended to sound out how Beijing would react and there is a possibility that Washington will send higher-ranking officials to Taiwan or invite senior Taiwan officials to visit the US.

Washington and Taipei enhanced the level of visiting officials to upset Beijing. This easy trick is supported within the US, but can be troublesome for Beijing to launch a counterattack. Hence this is a trump card for the US.

Beijing can downplay the influence of senior US-Taiwan officials' two-way travel since they are largely ceremonial and aimed at enraging the Chinese mainland. But the question is: The trick may go on endlessly until some day a US secretary of state or defense visits Taiwan or same-level Taiwan officials are invited to Washington, or even worse, a meeting of US and Taiwan leaders. Meanwhile, other countries will likely follow suit. To stop them will come at a diplomatic cost.

We must strike back against Washington's implementation of the Taiwan Travel Act. First, Beijing should not invite senior officials of the US Department of State and Defense who visit Taiwan, to the mainland during their terms. For instance, Wong should not be invited to the mainland until he no longer occupies the post. Senior Taiwan officials who visit the US and meet publicly with high-level US officials should be treated alike. This won't make the mainland suffer diplomatically. After all, Beijing and Washington have various channels to communicate.

Second, China can pressure the US in other areas of bilateral cooperation: for example, the Korean Peninsula issue and Iran nuclear issue. China can also set itself against the US in international organizations such as the UN. In addition, China needs to move fast to establish diplomatic ties with allies of Taiwan to further squeeze the island's space in the international community.

The mainland must also prepare itself for a direct military clash in the Taiwan Straits. It needs to make clear that escalation of US-Taiwan official exchanges will bring serious consequences to Taiwan. This newspaper has suggested that the mainland can send military planes and warships across the Taiwan Straits middle line. This can be implemented gradually depending on the cross-Straits situation.

Preventing the Taiwan independence movement and promoting unification through peaceful ways can be costly, perhaps costing more than the short-term loss brought about by forceful unification. It's a misunderstanding to think that peaceful unification will be a harmonious and happy process. The Taiwan authority will only turn around when left with no choice. Sticks matter more than flowers on the path to peaceful reunification.

In the grand games between China and the US, how we evaluate Sino-US relations should be based on whether the relationship is conducive to China's domestic politics and economic growth. Let's see which side cares more about the face of Sino-US relations: Beijing or the Trump administration. The next presidential election will be staged soon. If the bilateral ties turn into a mess, how will Trump explain it to his constituency?

Posted in: EDITORIAL

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<https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2018/03/20/asia-pacific/politics-diplomacy-asia-pacific/empowered-xi-says-china-ready-fight-bloody-battle-regain-place-world/#.WuonEemWzb1>  
**Empowered Xi says China ready to fight 'bloody battle' to regain place in world**

AFP-JIJI, AP, Bloomberg

BEIJING – Chinese President Xi Jinping delivered a blistering nationalist speech Tuesday, warning against any attempts to split China and touting the country’s readiness to fight “the bloody battle” to regain its rightful place in the world.

Xi's address capped an annual session of the National People's Congress that paved the way for him to rule for life, as China's most powerful leader since Mao Zedong pushes through his vision of guiding the country through a "new era" of unrivaled global military and economic supremacy.

Days after U.S. President Donald Trump signed new rules allowing top-level American officials to travel to Taiwan, Xi warned that Beijing would defend its "One China" principle, which sees the self-ruling island as its territory awaiting reunification, by force if necessary.

"Maintaining national sovereignty, territorial integrity and complete unification of the motherland is the common aspiration of all Chinese," Xi said.

"In the face of national righteousness and the tide of history, all attempts or tricks aimed at dividing the motherland are doomed to failure," he said to loud applause. "All will receive the condemnation of the people and the punishment of history."

The Chinese people have the will and ability to "foil all activities to divide the nation" and are united in their belief that "every inch of our great motherland absolutely cannot and absolutely will not be separated from China," Xi said.

Referring to self-governing Taiwan, Xi said the mainland would continue outreach to advance the cause of "peaceful unification" with the island, whose 23 million residents are strongly in favor of maintaining their de facto independent status.

After reaffirming U.S. support for the one-China principle last year, Trump has in recent months signaled a tougher line against Beijing and Friday signed the Taiwan Travel Act into law. The act encourages visits between the U.S. and Taiwan "at all levels," specifically citing "Cabinet-level national security officials." Chinese officials have said the act "seriously contravenes" the understanding between China and the U.S. over Taiwan.

"The recent 'Taiwan Travel Act' is a mine that America buried and one day it will blow up," said Xu Shijun, former director of the Institute of Taiwan Studies at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. "China will not sit back and take such actions. The U.S. should definitely integrate the message that Xi's sent this morning into its decision making process."

Wang Jiangyu, an international law professor at the National University of Singapore, said Xi's speech showed that Beijing would not budge on the issue.

"This is an official warning from China's top leader to the U.S. and Taiwan," Wang said. "It's an announcement that China will never compromise on Taiwan-related issues."

Xi also sought to address concerns about ambitious Chinese development projects abroad, saying they "will not pose a threat to any country."

"Only those who are accustomed to threatening others will see everyone as a threat," he added.

Xi used the speech to espouse his vision of realizing the "rejuvenation of the Chinese nation" — the "greatest dream" of the world's second-largest economy.

"The Chinese people have been indomitable and persistent, we have the spirit of fighting the bloody

battle against our enemies to the bitter end,” he said.

But his speech was also a reminder that the Communist Party, more than ever, reigns over the country’s affairs.

“History has already proven and will continue to prove that only socialism can save China,” he said.

“The Communist Party is the supreme political leadership of the country and the fundamental guarantee to achieve the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.”

The two-week session of the National People’s Congress handed Xi, 64, a second term and endorsed the Communist Party’s decision to lift presidential term limits, clearing the way for him to remain in power indefinitely after his second term ends in 2023.

His eponymous political philosophy, which was enshrined in the party charter last year, was added to the national constitution and senior government officials had to swear an oath to the document for the first time.

While delegates overwhelmingly supported the move, critics and some analysts say it raises concerns about a return to one-man-rule — and greater political repression within an already highly controlled polity.

“There is a distinct danger now that there may well be a return to the Maoist style of leadership symbolized by the dissolution of collective responsibility and the concentration of power under one person,” said Joseph Cheng, a longtime observer of Chinese politics now retired from the City University of Hong Kong.

Some of Xi’s key lieutenants were also promoted to top positions. His former anti-corruption czar, Wang Qishan, was elevated to the vice presidency while his top economic adviser, Liu He, became vice premier.

Wang could use his experience as a trade negotiator to deal with rocky relations with the Trump administration, while Liu is expected to have an influential role in economic policymaking.

Those moves were likely to further sideline Premier Li Keqiang, officially China’s No. 2 leader.

Li appealed to Washington on Tuesday to “act rationally” and avoid disrupting trade over steel, technology and other disputes, promising that Beijing will “open even wider” to imports and investment.

“No one will emerge a winner from a trade war,” Li told a news conference held during the meeting of the rubber-stamp legislature.

He made no mention of a possible Chinese response in the event Trump raises import barriers over trade complaints against Beijing, but other officials say Xi’s government is ready to act.

Trump’s government already has raised import duties on Chinese-made washing machines and other goods to offset what it says are improper subsidies and is investigating whether Beijing pressures foreign companies to hand over technology, which might lead to trade penalties. That has prompted fears of Chinese retaliation.

“What we hope is for us to act rationally rather than being led by emotions,” said Li. “We don’t want to see a trade war.”

Li also said Tuesday that he is willing to consider a formal visit to Japan amid signs of improving ties between the two nations. China hopes to see continuing improvements in its relations with Japan, he said.

In a sign of Li’s reduced status as Xi amasses power, the premier was flanked by eight newly promoted economic officials, in contrast to previous years when he appeared alone at the annual news conference.

They included Liu He, a Harvard-trained Xi adviser who was named a vice premier Monday and has told foreign businesspeople he will oversee economic reform. Neither Liu nor any of the other officials spoke at the event.

The premier traditionally is China’s top economic official but Xi has stripped Li of his most prominent duties by appointing himself to lead ruling party bodies that oversee economic reform and finance policy.

The legislature also approved the biggest government shake-up in years, merging the banking and insurance regulators to tackle financial risks, and amended the constitution to expand the Communist Party’s role in the country’s affairs.

Xi’s campaign against corruption within the Communist Party, which punished 1.5 million officials in five years, was expanded as the legislature voted Tuesday to create a national agency that will scrutinize millions of public servants.

“The Communist Party of China must ... resolutely eliminate” corruption, Xi said.

The government’s propaganda machine worked in overdrive to nurture a cult of personality around Xi and stamp out dissenting views during the two-week session.

The People’s Daily, the Communist Party’s mouthpiece, referred to Xi as the “helmsman” last weekend, an echo of Mao who was known as “the great helmsman.”

The abolition of term limits triggered a rare bout of criticism on social media, prompting censors to block dozens of phrases such as “I disagree” or “emperor” as well as satirical images such as Winnie the Pooh — the cartoon bear that some compare to Xi.

China has stepped up its crackdown on civil society since Xi took power in 2012, tightening online restrictions and detaining hundreds of activists and lawyers.

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<http://www.atimes.com/article/china-threatens-taiwan-but-how-far-will-beijing-go/>

### **China threatens Taiwan, but how far will Beijing go?**

Chinese President Xi Jinping said his country is prepared for a military clash and a 'bloody battle' as tensions rise across the Taiwan Strait

By Robert E. McCoy  
May 2, 2018

While the media continue to focus on developments from the recent summit between Pyongyang and Seoul and the upcoming meeting between Pyongyang and Washington, Beijing has taken advantage of the diversion to increase pressure on Taiwan.

Chinese President Xi Jinping, in a highly-charged speech before the National People's Congress, warned that Beijing was ready to fight its enemies in a "bloody battle" to regain its past glory and preserve its empire. Subsequently, an editorial in the Global Times, a state-owned but unofficial outlet for ideas that Beijing wishes to float for reaction, said China must prepare for a "direct military clash in the Taiwan Straits". These are not just words.

In fact, Taiwan is indeed beginning to openly discuss full independence. It is noteworthy that Xi has stated that resolution of the issue of Taiwan cannot be left to the future.

In recent weeks, Beijing sailed its aircraft carrier and associated support vessels through the Taiwan Strait, conducting live-fire exercises, and flew its bombers and fighters around the island nation at least twice last month.

This is not the first display of force by China in the area and China has not hesitated to engage in actual hostilities with regard to Taiwan.

#### Taiwan Strait incidents

China has always hungered to rein in the renegades on Taiwan, claiming the island is nothing more than a wayward province of the mainland. Also, those recent threats and shows of force by Beijing for the benefit of Taipei were not without precedent. There have been three series of clashes between China and Taiwan in the not-so-distance past.

The first occurred between September 1954 and May 1955 when China took over the Yijiangshan Islands and forced Taiwan to evacuate the Tachen Islands. Both island groups are in the East China Sea just off the coast of Taizhou on the mainland. American news media fixated on the artillery duels that took place between Taiwanese forces on the islands of Quemoy and Matsu and the Chinese army on the mainland.

A second Taiwan Strait crisis took place in August and September 1958, again involving artillery exchanges but also aerial combat between Taiwanese pilots in American Korean War vintage jets and Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) in Soviet aircraft of the same era.

A third set of engagements followed from July 1995 through March 1996 when China conducted missiles tests, initially near Pengjia Islet not far off the north coast of Taiwan. Following that, another series of missiles tests landed projectiles inside Taiwan's territorial waters within 45 to 65 kilometers off Keelung and Kaoshiung ports, the two being on opposite ends of Taiwan.

Commercial airline flights and shipping were disrupted by these events as Taiwan was effectively bracketed by the missiles.

The US stirs the pot

Soon after being elected – but before assuming office – US President Donald Trump accepted a congratulatory telephone call from Taiwan President Tsai Eng-wen. Perhaps this was out of ignorance of the formal US policy of not communicating directly with Taipei or maybe it was a portent of Trump's upcoming change in policy regarding China. Either way, Beijing was displeased.

In March this year, the US Congress unanimously passed and Trump signed the Taiwan Travel Act, designed to give moral and political support to Taipei by encouraging US officials to make recognized visits to the country.

In addition to the perhaps somewhat muted mutterings in Taipei, there were discussions in at least one Washington think tank about abandoning the "One China" policy. Understandably, this has Beijing all the more upset – to the point of threatening Taipei with overflights of its territory.

So, in view of the threat by China to conduct overflights of Taiwan, is that merely talk? Well, there are those three Taiwan Strait incidents that establish the precedent for military action. Regardless of whether the odds of such an event happening are low or high, both Taipei and Washington must be prepared.

The question becomes one of how to respond. Even if China makes only an aerial bluff by running bombers and fighters at the island but turning away at the last minute, such a challenge cannot go unanswered. Verbal or diplomatic protest are not effective in rebuffing such actions – and Taiwan along with its allies would be seen as impotent, thus encouraging more such incursions.

But diverting hostile aircraft away from a planned flight path is not easily done. Certainly, Taiwanese fighters can intercept the intruders and signal for them to turn away, but that might not be successful. And if the Chinese aircraft do intrude into Taiwan's airspace, what then?

Given the narrowness of the Taiwan Strait – 130 to 220kms – and the range of modern weaponry, Chinese airplanes would be vulnerable not long after reaching the midpoint between the two nations. An incursion into Taiwanese airspace – let alone an actual overflight – would create a major international incident. That says nothing about what could transpire should a Chinese airplane be shot up – or even shot down.

The US added more fuel to the fire by flying two B-52 long-range nuclear-capable bombers within 250 kilometers of Guangdong on the mainland to the west of Taiwan late last month. This is in addition to the Freedom of Navigation (FON) operations conducted by US warships in the South China Sea, not too distant from Taiwan.

Events in the airspace and seas around Taipei are certain to heat up this year, and while it is clear that bullies understand and respect only force, what is not known is how things will play out. Taiwanese independence and Xi Jinping's face are at stake.